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OPENING EXERCISES
The annual opening exercises of the
Dickinson School of Law were held in the
lecture room Wednesday, Oct. 2, it4P. M.
Nearly all of the faculty were present and
the large student body that crowded the
room indicated the prosperous condition of
the school, and her growing influence.
Dr. Reed, President, delivered the principal address of theoccasion. His remarks
were replete with wisdom and pleasant
humor. He said, in part, that the Dickillson School of Law, though one of the oldest institutions of its kind in the country,
had made its rapid strides since its incorporation under the present management,
and its removal to its present quarters.
His reference to the devoted industr y of
Dr. Trickett, the dean of the school, as an
important factor in the advancement of
the institution, and his tribute to him as a
great teacher and a commendable example,
were an echo of what was already a conviction of everyone acquainted with his
work.
Dr. Reed gave some wholesome advice
to the students, exhorting them to place

the proper value upon their time and keep
He also expressed the
a clean record.
hope that the affiliation between the different departments of Dickinson might
grow stronger in every way, and that all
might not only regard themselves as
members of a particular department, but
as students of a great institution.
Hon. James M. Weakley followed with
an address full of genial humor, and voicing that kindly spirit and personal interest
that always characterizes the able instructor of Equity in his contact with students.
The other members of the faculty present
made announcements concerning their
work, and assigned reading in the texts for
the first class meetings.
Dr. Trickett closed the meeting after the
announcement of theschedule, and general
suggestions to the students.
SCHOOL NOTES.
The large influx of new men this year
makes it pertinent for us to again call attention to the use of the books in the
library. Time is too valuable a possession
to be wasted, and the realization of this
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fact cannot occur too early. Your time is
too valuable to waste in searching through
a mass of books which haye been allowed
to accumulate on the library tables when,
if the book be not in use, and in its proper
place on the shelves, a moment would suffice to possess yourself of it. Do you not
expect, as a matter of right, that others
who use the books before you, should
respect the value of your time sufficiently
to replace the book where it belongs? Do
you leave books on the table? Others
have rights as well as you, their time is as
valuable as yours. Should you not respect
those rights and the value of their time sufficiently to replace the book you have
used? By co-operating in the matter we
not only fulfill an obligation to our fellows
in saving their time, but we, at the same
time, preserve the life of the books. We
have the privilege to use, but no license
to unnecessarily injure any one of so valuable a collection.
We suggest that the students read the
advertisements in THE Fonuz,and patronize the business men who have been kind
enough to give us their ads., and that way
assist in sustaining the same. They are
all reJiable and progressive men, and as
they have been kind enough to extend
theirpatronage to the Law School in advertising in THE FoRum, it is but just that
in return the men of the school should
extend a reciprocal courtesy toward these
gentlemen. Let us assist those who assist
THE FORUMi.
We are in perfect accord with the editor
of "The Dickinsonian" iii tie issue of Oct.
11 relative to the necessity of unity between College and Law School, and, with
him, feel that we are rapidly approaching
Ithat unity of sympathies so essential to
the harmonious working of an institution.
We believe that the contentions, hitherto
exibing, have been the result of unfortunate misunderstandings, in both departncxat, and not from an absence of desire
to cu-operate. There is no more opportune
time to adjust all differences than the
prient. We trust this adjustment will
speedily take place and that henceforth
both College and Law School will act together, in perfect unison, in the advancement of all interests looking toward the

best welfare of our Alma Mater-Dickinson.
The football team of this year is stronger.
than ever before and bids fair to make an
enviable reputation before the season is
over. The Law School is represented by
Core, Cannon, Phillips. Carlin and Shiffer,
all of whom are excellent players.
NEW PREPARATORY SCHOOL.
The Dickinson Preparatory School has
moved into the new buildiug,which stands
on a large campus, on Main St., and just
opposite the mansion and deer park of
Johnson Moore. Of white brick, four
stories, two hundred by seventy-five feet,
and tasteful in architecture, it is an imposi g structure and an ornament to Carlisle.
But it is the interior that most impresses
the visitor. For economy and utility of
space, forethought in arrangement, and
completeness of equipment,the building is
not equalled by any we have seen, and.we
believe, is unsurpassed in the country.
Space forbids a description of the interior,
although it would be a lesson in that part
of school architecture generally sacrificed
to external appearance. Everywhere are
evidences of the plans and care of the able
lead of the faculty, Prof. Frederick
Downes.
On the completion of a tour of the building, as we stood in a north window of one
of the hundred cozy students' rooms, and
looked over miles of beautiful farms, across
the famous Cumberland Valley to where
the haze of "Indian Summer" tinted the
Blue Ridge, one could not but be convinced
that, with such magnificent situation,with
unexcelled material equipment, and under
the direction of an able faculty, the Dickinson Preparatory School has gone far
toward approximating the ideal.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
The outlook for the year's work ini our
society is indeed gratifying. Many of the
new men were present at the last meeting
and great interest was manifested throughout. President Donahoe called on Mr.
McKeehan, who gave a very interesting
talk on the French people and their government. The talk was based on personal
observations, Mr. McKeehan having been
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a member of the American Commission to
the Paris Exposition. "Whispering Bill"
was recited by Mr. Crary in his own masterly manner. The question, "Resolved,
that the President of the United States is
inadeqhately protected"-was upheld by
Dever and Longbottom against Adamson
and Walsh. Decision for the affirmative.
Mr. Lonergan, of the Executive Committee, spoke of the plans arranged for
the year's work, which plans demonstrated
that the society work is being given much
thought. Mr. McKeehan was appointed
critic. Many propositions for membership
were received.

THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The last year's work of the Dickinson
Law Society has been the most satisfactory
of any since its organization. The continual interest taken by the older members
and the activity shown by the large
number of Juniors, who united with us
early in the year, assured for each meeting
a large attendance and interesting as well
as instructive programs toward which
every member contributed with a zeal seldom found in society work.
The intense interest which the Society
manifested in Parliamentary Law was a
step forward. The members are to be
heartily congratulated upon their determination to ever advance. It is this
spirit that has made the Society the reputation of which she is justly proud.
The first meeting of this school year,
held Thursday evening, October 3d, was
very encouraging. The program, which
consisted of orations, -recitations, extemporaneous addresses and debate was all
that could be desired.
Let us hope the President will carry out
the policy of progress outlined in his address of welcome, so that when the time
comes for him to lay down the gavel, the
society may be the better for his having
served as its President.
Probably one of the most interesting
programs which has been prepared for the
Society was rendered on Friday evening,
October 11.
Short addresses on "The
Value of Literary Societies in the Law
School" and "The Necessity of Stricter
Immigration Laws in the United States"
were given by Messrs. Peightel and Gerber

.

respectively. This was followed by an interesting debate, music and recitations.
Every participant in the program performed his part in an unusually acceptable
manner.
It is the object of the Executive Committee to furnish programs more of a literary character for future meetings in order
to meet the demand and give to the students that which they are most in need of
and at the same time furnish entertaininent.
Never has the society been in a more
prosperous condition, and unless all indications fail, the members will receive lasting benefit from the various meetings to
be held during the coming year.
ALUMNI NOTES.
James N. Lightner, '01, the former editor-in-chief of the FoRuM, has opened
an office in Lancaster, having been admitted to the bar of that county on September 13th.
A. Frank John, '00, was recently admitted to the Northumberland county
court.
LawrenceM. Sebring, '00, has openedan
office in Beaver county, having recently
passed a creditable examination there. He
enjoys the distinction of being the first
man from the Dickinson School of Law to
come up for examination and admission in
Beaver county.
Daniel Kline and L. Floyd Hess, both of
the class of '01, passed creditable examinations in June, and were admitted to
practice in the several courts of Luzerne
county. Mr. Kline has opened an office
in Freeland, also a branch office in White
Haven, and has already been retained on
important cases in both Carbon and Luzerne.
Lewellyn Hildreth, '99, has opened an
office at Atlantic City, N. J.
The School is deeply indebted to John
M. Rhey, '96, who kindly presented, for
the library, two copies of the Acts of 1901.
R. D. Nicholls, '01, has entered the office
of a prominent attorney in Philadelphia.
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the man pursuing solitary study, it is unquestionably a great boon. Indeed, Judge
Simonton, of Dauphin county, has predicted that "it will take the place Blackstone has too long occupied in the study
George Heist, '01, was recently married
to Lillian M. Hoftber, of Glenside, Pa.
of law in America for wantofsuch a work."
Mr. Heist isa nember of the Philadelphia
It is surprising to find, upon examination
Bar.
of the book, that nearly half of its pages
are devoted to an excellent exposition of
Cards are out announcing the marriage our system of government. Such topics
of Bruce Hall Campbell, '96, and Miss
as "The People," "The Public Domain,"
Mabel Entwisle, to occur on October 2.Ard,
"Tie National Government.," "The Naat Johnstown.
tional Revenue" and "Local Self-Government" constituntingeach an entire chapter;
Garrett Stevens, '00, was recently marsome of them of very considerable length.
ried to Miss Stayman, of this city.
Consequently there remain only six hundred pages in which to treat of private
W. V. Curry, '94, was married on Oct.
law, some of Ihe most important branches
16, to Miss Louise Albro, of Scranton.
of which are barely touched upon. The
brevity in the statement of Real Property
C. E. Daniels, '99, of 8cranton, and Miss
(sixty-eight page.5) and of Procedure, is
Lillian Simpson were married in Septemsought to be -explained in the preface.
ber.
"The subjects," says Professor Andrews,
"are of so complicated a character that it
We also note the marriage of R. J. Boris really easier to treat them at length than
yer, a fnrmer member of the class of 1902.
to summarize them accurately. It is my
belief that the introductions to these subN.
LightJames
We were pleased to see
jects, with outlines, will prove more useful
ner, '01, and Robert Smith, '00, in town
to the beginner than would a more elaborduring the mouth.
ate treatise." Whatever may be thought
of this view, it certainly has no application
BOOK REVIEWS.
to criminal law, which is covered in three
pages although one ot the four grand diviA-MfERICA-N LAW. A treatise on thejursions or "Parts" of the work, or to Torts,
'isprudence, constitution and laws of the
which does not even appear as a separate
United States. By James De Witt Antitle.
Chicago.
Company,
and
Callaghan
drews,
Although apparently lacking balance of
1900, pp. LXII, 1245.
treatment, the work is in most respects
We believe that this is the first Ameriadmirable. It is thorough, analytical in
can work in which an earnest attempt is
a high degree, and so far as we are able to
made to completely classify our legal sysjudge, accurate. A vast amount of learntem. The object, says the author, is to
ing and of industry has been expended
produce "an elementary treatise possessing
upon it, and in a sense it is a pioneer. Its
as much of the practical as is possible
reception has certainly been flattering.
within the space devoted to the work."
The American Law Review calls it the
To that end the origin and growth of
greatest book of theyear, and declares that
principles are presented, and the treatment
it is not surpassed by Blackstone or Kent
is followed up to show the present state of
or Story or Greenleaf. That is high praisethe law, and is fortified by citations serather too high, we think; but of the great
hislected with special reference to their
and permanent value (f the work there is
torical value to the student and practical
no doubt.
value to the jurist.
The practicing lawyer of to-day is not in
THE DEBATEs ON THE FEDERAL CONSTIsuch great need of an institutional work of
TUTION. Together with the Journalof the
this character as he was in the times of
FederalConvention, Luther Martin's LetBlackstone and of Kent. Nor is it of ester, Gates's Minutes etc,, etc,, 5 volumes,
Second Edition. Collected and revised by
pecial value as a law school text. But to
Jasper Alexander, '01, has entered into
partnership with J. Banks Ralston, '00,of
this city.
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Jonathan Elliott. J. B. Lippincott Com-

No. 4.

pany, Philadelphia,1901.
Rarely since its adoption has the Federal
Constitution been so generally discussed
as at the present time. As in the years
preceding the great civil war differences
as to its interpretation constitute the chief
political questions of the day. Elliott's
Debates has always been regarded as valuable in the highest degree in revealing the
views of the men who made the Constitution as well as of those who debated its
adoption bytheseveral states. It therefore
forms a most useful addition to the library
of the student of history, of politics, or of
law. The publishers have issued the work
in very attractive form, the printing being
excellent and the binding neat and durable.

No. 5.

No. 6.

No. 7.
No. 8.

No. 9.

No. 10.

The following books are acknowledged.
Reviews will follow.
THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. By Prancis .3 Burdick. Second
Edition, Revised. Little, Brown & Co.,
Boston, 1901.
THE LAW*V OF AGENCY. Including th
Law of Principaland Agent and the Law
of .. faster and Servant. By Ernest W.
Huffeut. Second -Edition, Revised and
.Ealarged. Little, Brown & Co., Boston,
1901.
The following is a schedule of counsel in
the Mfoot Court cases which have been
given out up to time of going to press:
Case.

No. 1.

No. 2.

No. 3.

Plaintiff.

No. 11.

No. 12.

No. 13.

No. 14.

Ebbert,
Jones,

Delaney, L.,
Hickernell.

Turner, J.
Keelor,
Longbottoni,
Schanz,
Stauffer.
Logan, 3.
Kline,
Mays,
Miller,
Peightel.
Rhodes, F., J.
Fox,
Mowry,
Schnee,
Phillips.
Minnich, J.
Sherbine,
Vastine,
Watson,
Wanler.

Moon, J.
No. 15.

Defendant.

Adamson,
Turner,
Brock,
Thorne.
MaeConnell, J.
Sterrett,
Davis,
Elmes,
Houser.
Laubenstein, J.
Laubenstein,
MlcIntire,
MacConnell,
McKeehan.
Lonergan, J.

Minnich,
Moon,
Points,
Rhodes. F.
McKeehan, J.
Logan,
Conry,
Ames,
Bishop.
Rhodes, J., J.
Bouton,
Breniian,
Cannon,
Claycomb.
Sterrett, J.
Lonergan,
Rhodes, J.,
Core,
Crary.
Adamson, 3.
Cooper,
Delaney, Ed.,
Kaufman,
Lauer,
Thorne, J.
Dever,
Donahoe,
Gerber,
,Hoagland.
Brock, 5.

No. 16.

No. 17.

No. 18.

Walsh,
Welsh,
Williamson,
Myers.
Mclntire, J.
Hamblen,
Gross,
Wright, :Elmes, J. Yeagley.
Brock,
Elmes,
MacConnell,
Points.
Houser, J.
Adamson,
Davis.
Laubenstein,
Moon.
Points, J.

The following is the arraugement of lectures for this term :

IMonday

Tuesday

Wed iesday

Thursday

Friday

Real Prop 8.20
r.,

Real Prop., 8.20
Torts, 11.30

Contracts, 9.30

Contracts, 9.30

CLASS

Real Prop., 8.20
S rp. .3
Crii. Layw, 1.30

Crire. Law, 1.30

Crir. Law, 1.30

Torts, 11.30

Torts, 11.30

MIDDLE

Dec.Estates, 9.30

Dec. Est., 9.30

Dec. Est., 9.30

Evidence, 8.20

Evidence, 8.20

CLASS

Sales, 11. 00

Practice,2.30

Practice,2.30

Equity, 2.30

Equity, 2.30

SENIOR

Quasi-Cont., 9.3u

Quasi-Con., 9.30

Wills, 11.00

Cons. Law, 9.30
Cn.Lw Partnership,1.30

Cons. Law,
a,93 9.30
os
Partnership, 1.30

JUNIOR

Sales, 11.00

-

Sales, 10.30

Wills, 11.00
2.30 11.00
Practice,
2.30
Wills,
ilJuris., .0
CLASSCAS Med.
ed.is,
Praic,
.30
6Practice,2.30
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MOOT COURT.
FREDERICK WARD vs., HENRY
DESMOND.
Avoidance of contract-futual mistake
as to a future fact as ground for the
avoidance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Ward sold to Desmond a farm for S5,000;
$2,000 being paid in cash and Desniond
covenanting to pay the balance in two (2)
months. At the time the sale was made
it was supposed by both parties that a
proposed railroad would be immediately
constructed across the farm aad that a
station would be established on the land
sold. Shortly afterward the railroad was
constructed, but along a different route.
Ward sues for the balance of the purchase
money and Desmond sets up mutual mistake. It is conceded that the farm without the railroad and station upon it is only
worth $2,000.
E. A. DELANEY and C. H. KEELOR for
plaintiff.
Mistake must go to the very nature of
the thing. Miles v. Stephens, 3 Pa. 21.
V. E. SCHNEE and C. M. STAUFFER for
defendant.
Mutual mistake of a fundamental fact
will avoid a contract.
Mays v. Dwight,
82 Pa. 464; Miles v. Stepheps, 3 Pa. 21;
Reigel v. Ins. Co., 140 Pa. 193: Fink v.
Smith, 170 Pa. 124.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action to recover the balance
of the purchase price of a tract of land.
The defendant resists on the ground that,
at the time the alleged contract was made
both parties were the victims of such a
mistake as affords a valid defense to the
action.
As to the existence of a mistake there is
no dispute. "It was supposed by both
parties that a proposed railroad would be
immediately constructed across the farm,
and that a station would be established on
the land sold." The purchase price was
$5,000, of which $2,000 has been paid; it is
conceded that the latter sum fairly represents the value of the property without the
railroad.
In the books are recorded many instances
of attempts to enforce contractual obligations which have been resisted on the

ground of mistake; sometimes successfully,
sometimes otherwise.
"Not every mistake will avoid a contract" is fundamental
law.
The courts have laid down certain requirements as to the nature and extent of
the misapprehension, and every one who
seek9 relief, on this ground must fit his
case to these requirements. Whether or
not he has done so, in any particular case,
must depend, of course, upon the determination of the question, What are the kinds
of mistakes as to which relief has been
afforded?
In Gibson v. the Union Rolling Mill
Company, 3 Watts 32; Gibson, C. J., says:
"The misconception must be a mutual one
and of a fact which entered into the contemplation of both parties as a condition
of their assent." In a later case, substantially the same rule has been expressed
thus: "Where certain facts assumed by
both parties are the basis of a contract and
it subsequently appears such facts do not
exist, the contract is inoperative."
Fink
v. Smith, 170 Pa. 124. In numerous other
cases these doctrines have been applied.
Thus, in Riegel v. Ins. Co., 140 Pa. 193. it
was held that one who surrenders a life
insurance policy for a smaller paid up one,
in ignorance of the fact that the insured
was dead at the time, could recover the
amount of the surrendered policy. The
surrender not being binding because made
under the mistaken belief that the insured
was still alive and that the plaintiff was
therefore underobligation to pay premiums
for an indefinite period. In Mays v.
Dwight, 82 Pa. 462, plaintiff leased a tract
of oil land to defendant; both parties mis
takenly believing that a certain well was
situated thereon. Defendant agreed to sink
the well deeper and to pay the plaintiff a
certain royalty of the oil produced therefrom. It afterwards appearing that the
well was upon another tract under lease to
defendant, it was held that plaintiff's bill
for an account should have been dismissed.
Many other cases might be cited as illustrations of the rule, among which may
be mentioned Wilson's Appeal, 109 Pa. 606;
Johnson's Appeal, 18 W. N. C. 205 and
Babcock v. Day, 104 Pa. 4.
Has the defendant brought his case within the protecting influence of these decisions? That there was a misapprehension
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common to both parties is undisputed;
that the fact, mistakenly assumed, was the
basis of the contract, cannot be denied
without denying the defendant's sanity.
No man in his right mind will pay one
and a half times the known value of his
purchase.
But counsel for plaintiff object that this
was a speculative arrangement; that the
parties having contracted with reference
to the happening of a future event, must
be presumed to have taken the risk of the
event justifying the expectation. This
objection might have some weight if it
were not for the fact that the risk seenis to
have been entirely one sided; for while it
appears that the farm without the railroad
was worth S8,000 less than the contract
price, it does not appear that, in the contemplation of the parties, it would be
worth, with the railroad, anything like
that amount more than the contract price.
Moreover, the objection is fully answered
by the case of Miles v. Stevens, 3 Pa. 21,
in which it was decided that an action on
a contract based upon an erroneous belief,
common to both parties, thata canal would
terminate at the mouth of a creek, included in the land contracted for, and that a
government appropriation would be made
for the erection of a harbor there, whereby
the value of the land would be greatly increased, could not be maintained. This
broad doctrine was laid down: "When
parties have presupposed some rights or
facts to exist, or that they will hereafter"
exist, as the basis of their proceedings,
which in truth do not exist or are prevented from happening by unforeseen causes
ending in mutual error, under circumstances material to their character and
consequences, the contract is, on general
principles, inoperative."
The case at bar fits into this rule to a
nicety, and between the sets of facts of the
two cases, out of which the mistakes grew,
there is a degree of similarity seldom
found.
It might be said that a shade has been
cast upon the authority of Miles v. Stevens
by some expressions of the court in Pennock v. Telford, 17 Pa. 456, in which
Black, C. J., remarks obiter, "We are not
prepared to reaffirm the doctrines there
laid down in all their length and breadth."
But the court expressly refrained from

7

overruling the ease or specifically limiting
its application. Furthermore, in a much
later case, Fink v. Smith, 170 Pa. 124,
Miles v. Stevens is cited without adverse
comment. We regard the case as a binding precedent and must, therefore, enter
judgment for the defendant.
Judgment entered for defendant.
BARR, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The contract between Ward and Desniond is not impeached on the ground of
fraud.
Desmond was mistaken as to
future facts, but this mistake, so far as appears, was not the result of Ward's representations.
Desmond seems to have
reached his expectations concerning them,
independently of Ward. Had Desmond's
opinion been the product of Ward's representations, it would be impossible to censure them as fraudulent, for Ward believed
them to be true. The defendant contended
that both parties were mistaken, and that
but for the mistake on Desmond's part, he
would either not have agreed to buy the
land at all, or not have agreed to pay more
than $2,000 for it.
The learned court
accepting this view, has decided that there
can be no recovery of the $3,000, still unpaid.
The principle is well established that
when a mistake, on the part of vendor and
vendee, exists, in respect to the subject of
the sale, and but for the attributes mistakenly assigned to this subject by the
parties, the vendee would not have bought
it, or would not have agreed to pay for it
the price contracted for, he may disengage
himself from the obligation to accept and
pay for it, or, accepting it, to pay for it more
than its actual value. The cases cited in
the able opinion of the learned court of
common pleas sustain this thesis.
Most of the cases relied on are cases of
mistake with respect to existing facts; e.g.
the inclusion within the premises of certain barns, Babcock v. Day, 104 Pa. 4; or
of an oil well, Mays v. Dwight, 82 Pa. 462;
or of a certain area, Johnson's Appeal, 18
W. N. C. 205; the happening of a tax sale,
under which the vendor was supposed to
be owner, Goettel v. Sage, 117 Pa. 298; the
death of the assured, prior to the exchange
of a life policy for another paid up policy,
Riegel v. Ins. Co., 153 Pa. 134; the decisiveness of an acquittal of one who, having
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taken a horse, was indicted for larceny, of
his being the owner of the horse, Fink v.
Smith, 170 Pa. 124.
The case of Miles v. Stevens, 3 Pa. 21, is
relied upon by the learned court below to
justify the extension of the principle to
mistakes concerning future facts. Miles,
owning land along Lake Erie, agreed to
sell an undivided half of it to B and C for
$5,000 and the proceeds of the sales of lots
into which it was to be carved, up to $75,000. B was an influential politician, and
was expecting, not to say intending, that
both the government of Pennsylvania and
that of the United States should spend
moneys on the neighborhood so as to make
a harbor and important entrepOt. The
result of this expenditure would probably
have been to largely increase the value of
the land. Indeed, the sanguine imagination of Mr. B saw in the near future a
glorious city, with a teeming population,
a splendid mart of trade. Unfortunately,
the state and federal legislatures, superior
to solicitation, refrained from making the
appropriations.
The purchasers then
refused to pay the $5,000, and suit being
brought, alleged that both parties had expected the appropriations, and that the
vendees had bought the land under the
influence of this expectation. The court
said that there had been a common mistake of an important fact, and rescued the
disappointed lobbyists from their liability
to pay the $5,000.
This case has not been entirely satisfactory to the profession or to the courts,
Pennock v. Telford, 17 Pa. 456; Watts v.
Cummins, 59 Pa. 84; Clark v. Everhart,
63 Pa. 347. Both parties in it knew that
they were speculating about an event
over which they had no legitimate control.
They knew that its occurrence was and
must remain uncertain, until iu should, if
ever, actually take place. It is quite clear
that the vendees were willing to pay $5,000
for the chance of making a million, and
that when the chance passed by, they
wanted to escape from paying the price of
it. They had had it for a year or more,
and had they succeeded, would have insisted on their contract, and pocketed the
enrichment that would follow. Not succeeding they were unwilling to pay the
stipulated consideration for it.
We turn gladly from this case to one

which, we think, contains a sounder principle. In Watts v. Cummins, 59 Pa. 84,
Cummins owned land supposed to he oil
land. A company was formed to develop
it. It was valued at $60,000, and Watts
bought a share giving, a promissory note
for $1,000. The land did not prove to contain oil, and Watts desired to escape from
paying his note. The existence of oil was
unknown to both parties. Any opinion
expressed by the vendor or his agent, as to
it, "was," says Agnew, J., "but a matter
of mere belief and uncertain. * * He (the
vendee) knew as well as the vendors, that
they were bargaining about a matter altogether problematical, of which he must
necessarily take the risk, unless he had
guarded against it by a covenant." In
this case the vendee's expectation of oil
was probably produced in part by the expressed opinion of the vendor or of one who
was co-operating with him in the enterprise. In Miles v. Stevens there is no intimation that Miles was anything else
than a farmer, knowing little of the great
world of politicians, while the defendants,
as shown by their letters, were habitues of
the halls of legislation, and adepts in political manipulation. Not Miles caused
them to expect the harbor and the, canal,
the splendid city and the opulent mart,
but evidently they him. If, then, the defendant in Watts v. Cummins had no good
defense, afortiori,was there none in Miles
v. Stevens. In both, the purchase was of
the land plus a chance. The parties had a
right to put what value they chose on
both. It was not for the courts to relieve
them as infants or weaklings or non compotes mentis. They got what they bargained for, the land and the chance. When
A insures his barn for a year, he pays for
the chance of an indemnity in case of
necessity. He does not recover his premiumn, if, the year over, his barn has not
been burned. He has not paid hispremium
for nothing. He has paid it for a chance.
and he has got what he paid it for Desmond has contracted to pay $5,000 for the
land, and the chance of its enrichment by
a railroad and a station. He has received
what he bargained and paid for. He must
not be permitted to have had that, and to
keep the money, too.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
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equity that although a trustmaynothave
ceased by expiration of time and although
Trusts-A ctive-Spendthrift-Alienatio'n all its purposes may not have been accomplished, yet if all the parties who are interof trdit property.
rested in the trust property are in existSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
ence and are suijuris and if they all consent and agree thereto, the courts of equity
Joseph Dare bequeathed to his executor
may decree the determination of the trust
$20,000 in trust, to invest it and pay the
and the distribution of the fund among
net income over to the guardian of his
those entitled thereto. No matter what
son Jacob during the minority of the latter,
may be the natural termination of the
and to Jacob thereafter until the end of
trust it continues no longer than the trust,
his 30th year, and then to pay the principal to him. When Jacob reached major- demands. Ubertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 14-5.
We find nothing to show that Jacob Dare
ity he applied to the Orphans' Courtto deis incompetent to manage his estate propcree the payment of the $20,000 to himself.
erly, neither can we find anything which
The court appointed an auditor, who retends to make this a spendthrift trust, or
commended that the decree be made bethe result might be different.
cause the trust was invalid after Jacob's
In Moss's Estate, 15 Phila. 516, a cestui
majority. Exceptions.
que trust who is entitled to the whole inJONES and KAUF3AN for plaintiff cited:
terest may call upon the trustee for a conP. and L. Dig., Vol. 2, Col. 4055; Hempveyance. We are of the opinion that the
hill's Estate 180 Pa. 95.
court below erred in confirming the report
KEELOR and DEVER for defendant.
of the auditor and the decree of the court
Ward's Estate 13 W. N. 283.
is reversed.
And as Jacob Dare is the only oneinterOPINION OF THE COURT.
In this case the trustee was to invest the ested in this trust and has applied to have
it determined, the Court orders the trust
money and pay over the net income to
terminated and the $20,000 to be paid over.
the guardian of the cestui que trust. This
JOHN N. MINNICH, J.
without a doubt created an active trust in
Pa. Trusts are divided into passive or
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
technical and active or operative trusts.
The bequest is to the executors ofS20,000,
In Barnett's appeal, 10 Wright 392, the
in trust to invest that sum, to pay the net
learned court said, among the active trusts
proceeds over to the guardian of Jacob,
has always been classed that to receive
during Jacob's minority, and afterwards
and pay over the net income to another in
to Jacob himself until the end of his 30th
which case the land must remain in the year. At that time, the fund is to be paid
trustee to enable him to perform the trust. over to him.
And this was likewise held in Bacon's
The trust is what is known as active.
appeal, 7 P. F. Smith 504; Vaux v. Parke,
The trustee is to pay the "net income" to
7 W. & S. 19. We can see nothing which
Jacob. It is clear that the testator did not
makes the trust invalid.
intend Jacob to have possession or control
The counsel for the plaintiff seem to
of the fund until his 31st year. The exechave entirely overlooked the point, and in
utor was to exercise a discretion with refact the whole case almost, that the trust
spect to the form of investment, the rate
although activecould be determined by the
of interest, the character of the securities.
consent of all parties interested. In HenHemphill's Estate, 180 Pa. 95.
derson's Estate, 15 Phila, 598, it was held
The cestui que trust wishes to wrest the
that a trust to collect and pay overthe infund from the control of the executor and
come and at the end of 7 years to distrigain it for himself. Conceding that the
bute the principal is an active trust, yet it
trust is active, the learned court below has,
may be terminated before the prescribed
nevertheless, terminated it because the
time at the request of the cestui que trustcestui que trust has wished it terminated.
ent who are suijuris. If one should dis- The object of the trust was to restrict the
sent it is immaterial, his share can remain
power of the cestui que trust over the fund,
in the trust. It is a well settled rule in
so that it might yield him a support, de-

THE FORUM
spite any prodigality or improvidence of
himself. Such trusts would be useless if
they were terminable at the option of the
very persons whom they were invented to
protect. The cases cited by the learned
court below do not sustain the principle
t hat a valid trust can be ended at the mere
wish of the cestui quo trust, when its purpose was clearly to exempt the fund from
his control.
We must consider whether the trust is
in fact a valid one, though active. The
law favors the separation of the power to
control a fund, from the beneficial ownership of that fund, by means of trusts, only
when some substantial advantage to the
cestui que trust, or to some ulterior owner,
is in contemplation. A fee in a married
woman, may be charged with a trust, in
order to suspend her power of alienation or
of incumbrance, while she is under marital influence. A life estate, or, a fee, may
be given to a son or daughter, subject to a
trust whose object is to prevent his or her
imprudent alienation of the property. His
suspension of this alienation may be for
life, the ordinary case, or until the cestui
quo trust reaches the age of 25 or 28 years,
Eberly'sAppeal, 110 Pa. 95; Kay V. Scates,
37 Pa. 31; Ward's Estate 13 W. N. 283; of.
Handy's Estate 167 Pa. 5'3. Such trusts
are often termed "spendthrift" trusts, but
they may be made, when that term of disparagement is not justified. rn Eberly's
Appeal, the cestui quo trust was but eight
years old, when the trust began. Such
trusts can be invented for daughters, as
well as sons. Nor need the settler state
his motive for making the settlement. It
hiay be i*nferred from the terms of the
settlement, themselves. The court will
"presume" that there was "good reason"
for the provision, Watsohs Appeal, 125
Pa. 340.
The estate of the cestui que trust is often
followed by another in a different person;
and, when the latter is a contingent interest or the subject of it is personalty the trust
may have an additional object, viz, the
preservation of the estate from destruction
or of the fund from waste. But, no good
reason can be seen for holding that a trust
to protect a fund for A, until he reaches the
age of 25 or 30, should not bb supported,
although he is to have it absolutely at the
age designated. The gift of the fund, how-

ever, to Jacob Dare, is contingent upon his
reaching the age of 30 years. It does not
appear that he would beentitled to it under
the intestate law, on the ground that the
will makes no disposition of it, in case he
should not attain the age of 30 years.
If it appeared that the $20,000 were to
belong unconditionally to Jacob when lie
completed his 30th year, it might be a serious question whether the object of the
trust was sufficient to sustain it. It does
not appear that Jacob may not, between
the age of 21 and 30 years, sell his interest
in the fund, his right, that is, not only to
the corpus, at 30 years, but also to the anual income therefrom. In order to make
the trust really useful, the willshould have
withheld from him the power to disposeof
either interest or corpus, until he had
reached his 31st year. It has not done so.
The trust, if sul)ported, would practically
be for the benefit or detriment rather of
some unknown purchaser, should Jacob
choose to sell. To give utility to the trust
the will should have coupled with it a prohibition against alienation by Jacob. Such
a prohibition we are not at liberty to
imply.
The preservation of the fund for those
who may be entitled to it, on the death of
Jacob before his 31st year, is sufficient
cause however for the maintenance of the
trust. His consent to its abrogation is irrelevant. The order of the court below
must be set aside, and the petition dismissed.
CONRAD HARTMAN vs. RICHARD
STOREY.
Principaland Agent-Breachof warranty
-Liability of principalfor misrepresentation of agent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Storey employed one Albert Owen to sell
a carload of grain for him, authorizing him
to warrant the grain as of second quality
or grade. Owen sold the grain to Hartman, representing it to be of thefirst grade.
Hartman brings suit against Storey in
trespass for deceit. Verdict for defendant.
Motion for new trial.
POINTS and ADAMSON for plaintiff.
The principal undertakes for absence of
fraud, the agent actingwithin thescope of

tIH
his employment.
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McNeile v. Cridland

168 Pa. 19; Meyerhoff v. Daniels 173 Pa:
.555.
LONERGAN and TURNER for defendant.
There must be evidence of knowledge or
participation on the part of the principal
to bind him for deceit of his agent. Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353; Freyer v. McCord, 165 Pa. 540; Keefe v. Scholl, 181 Pa.
90; Erie City Iron Works v. Barber, 106
Pa. 125.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action for deceit brought by a
third person against the principal for the
tortious acts of his agent. The decisions
in Pemsylvania relative to the liability
of tile principal for the tortious acts of his
agent are somewhat conflicting. Some of
the decisions hold the principal liable for
any tortious act of his agent, while others
are disposed to deal with him more leniently, and hold him liable only where he
particil)ates in the fraud, or where it can
be imputed to him.
We think that the case at bar is one
where the fraud was perpetrated by the
agent without any participation whatever
on tile part of the principal. When Storey
employed Owen he gave hinli express instructions as to what representations he
should make to the buyer of the grain.
Owen made representations that were not
only contrary to his express instructions,
but were also false and fraudulent, made
wilfully and knowingly with an intent to
deceive. By making such representations
he exceeded his authority both real and apparent. Storey was at no time during this
agency conscious'of what deception his
agent was perpetrating upon the buyer.
At the time the fraud was perpetrated the
deceitful purposes of the agent were not
inherent in the mind of his principal. The
mind of the principal harbored no fraud,
legal or moral, that would render him
liable. On the other hand, the agent was
the one whose deceitful mind caused the
fraudulent transaction. Certainly, the
law is not so unjust as to hold this innocent principal liable for the tortious acts
of his agent, in which acts he did not participate, and which cannot be imputed to
him. If Storey did not participate in the
fraud or have knowledge of it, and if it is
not imputable to him, he cannot be held
liable.

it

As we have said, the decisions in Pennsylvania are conflicting, and difficult to
reconcile. In Erie City Iron Works v.
Barber and Co., 106 Pa. 125, the fraud of
the agent was not imputed to the principal. In Freyer v. McCord, 165 Pa. 540, the
court held, "that in an action of deceit
against a prhmcipal to recover damages for
misrepresentations made by an agent, the
fraud should be clear, and there should be
in addition some evidence of participation
or knowledge on the part of the principal,
or circumstances which should have put
hlim upon inquiry." Keefe et. ux.v. Scholl,
181 Pa. 90 is authority for the same principle. The case of Kennedy v. McKay,
48 N. J. L. 288, helps us very much to decide the case at bar. It adheres strongly
to the doctrine that the fraud must be imputed to the principal before he can be
rendered liable.
See also, Decker v.
Fredericks, 47 N. J. L.469. Quite anumber of cases hold the principal liable for
the tortious acts of his agent. Such as
Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353. But, the
reason that the principal was held liable in
that case was, that she not only knew of
the preparation of the deceptive circular,
by her agent, but had herself given it to
some parties who inquired about theproperty. That element is entirely wanting
in the present case.
We might cite other cases that held the
principal liable for the tortious acts of his
agent, but we think that it would be useless, as we have cited sufficient authority
in the first part of our opinion to decide
this case in favor of the defendant in error.
The plaintiffin error was deceived by Owen
and his action for deceit should have been
against him. A second remedy is a rescission of the contract of sale and a reclaimation of the money paid by him from the
vendor. New trial refused.
HOWARD L. HENDERSON, T.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

The question presented to us is, was the
trial court in error in giving binding instructions to the defendant? In answering this question, we shall (1) consider the
case, as it would be had Storey directly
made the representations to Hartman; (2)
consider it, as it actually is.
One of the elements of fraud is the knowledge, by the party alleged to be guilty of
it, of the untruth of his representations, or
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of his ignorance as to whether they are
untrue or not. It does not distinctly
appear that Storey knew that the grain
which he was selling was not of the first
grade. He authorized Owen to warrant
it to be of the second grade. It may hence
be inferred that he was unwilling to warrant it of the first grade, and the unwillingness may have been the result, and probably was the result, either of his belief that
the grain was not of the first grade, oi of
his conscious ignorance whether it was or
not. But the inference ought to have been
made by the jury and it would have been
error for the court to determine that it
could not properly be drawn. If, with
knowledge of its untruth, or of his ignorance of its truth, Storey had given the
warranty that the grain was of the first
grade, he would have been guilty of fraud.
But, in the actual case, the knowledge
that the grain was of the second grade,
was in Storey, and the representation that
it was of the first grade was by Owen, and
Owen was instructed by Storey to warrant
the grain in accordance with his, Storey's
belief, and in accordance with the fact, to
be of the second grade. The question that
we have to deal with is, will the act and
the state of mind of Owen be so imputed
to Storey as to make him liable for the
deceit, for which Owen, if acting for himself would have been liable?
It is no new thing to impute to a principal bad states of mind. Negligence is
such a state of mind, and it is constantly
imputed. A corporation is conceived as a
person, distinct from the persons who act
vicariously for it. Torts of various sorts,
involving malice, recklessness and fraud
committed by its agents, are frequently
treated as committed by itself. Erie City
Iron Works v. Barber, 106 Pa. 125. In this
case Benjamin, Sales is quoted to the effect
that'Ithepurchaser can maintain an action
of deceit against the innocent principal,
when the fraud of the agent has been committed within the scope of his authority,
and where the principal has benefited by it.
In this respect it makes no difference
whether the principal be a corporation or
an individual." .bid p. 137.
Unfortunately, the decisions in this state
are difficult to reconcile. Iron works v.
Barber, supra, recognizes the imputableness of the deceit of an agent to a principal,

which is a corporation. In Griswold v.
Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353, Eliza Griswold employed her brother-in-law and Mr. Everhart to sell a tract of land for her. Everhart advertised it as containing seven
acres. It in fact contained but four and
two-tenths acres. An action for deceit
was brought by the purchaser agains ,
Mrs. Griswold. The trial court submitted
three questions to the jury, which were in
brief (1) wasJohn Griswold empowered by
her to make the sale; (2) did John Griswold state what he knew to be untrue, or
that the truth, of which he was conscious
that he did not know; (3) was this statementcredited by the purchaser? "If these
que-tions should be answered in the affirmative," said the court, "the jury may give
a verdict for the plaintiff.' The jury gave
such a verdict. The judgment entered
thereon was affirmed by the supreme court.
As to the principal's responsibility for
the misrepresentations of the agent, Mitchell, J., says: (1) that he is responsible
when the representations are within his
apparent power; but, (2) that question
does not arise, however, because there was
"testimony" that the defendant knew of
and distributed the circular containing the
erroneous statement. The cogency of this
last remark is diminished by the consideration that there was also "testimony" that
the defendant did not know of and did not
distribute the circular. Whether she did
or not does not seem to have been submitted to the jury. The judgment for the
plaintiff cannot, therefore, be supported on
the hypothesis that Mrs. Griswold participated, except by proxy, in the fraud.
In Keefe v. 8holl, 181 Pa. 90, trespass
for deceit, practiced by the agent of a
vendor of land was brought against the
vendor. There had been a misrepresentation as to the area of the land. The declaration averred no scienter, on the part either
of principal or agent, nor was any proof of
such scienter furnished. The non-suit was
affirmed by the supreme court. It is said
in theper curiam opinion, Iin the absence
of any evidence of such knowledge on her
part especially, (i. e., "guilty knowledge
on the part of the defendant") there
could be no recovery." This is bare dictum.
Freyer v. McCord, 165 Pa. 539, remains
to be considered as an authority for the
doctrine that to a principal the deceit of an
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agent cannot be imputed, unless he was
authorized to use the deception. McCord,
the owner of land, had authorized Ochse
to sell it. Freyer, the purchaser, alleging
that he had been told by Ochse that the
land purchased included apiece which was
not embraced in the deed, brought trespass
for deceit against McCord. The evidence
is notreported and the references toit in the
opinion of the court leave us entirely doubtful whether any deception had been practiced on Freyer. The court, however, lays
down the principle that to charge a principal with the fraud of the agent in an action
of deceit, there "should be some evidence of
participation or knowledge on the part. of
the principal, or circumstances which
should have put him upon inquiry." But,
to charge him with deceit, because he
should have made inquiry, is to abandon
the test of participation in amoral wrong.
It is not denied that if one who deals
with an agent is imposed on by the latter
to his hurt there should be some redress
against the principal, even if the agent
has violated the instructions given him.
FVreyer v. McCord, 165 Pa. 139. Thus, the
purchaser of land may defend in the scire
facias for the purchase money, on the
ground that misrepresentations were made
to him by the agent, McNeile v. Uridland,
168 Pa. 16. The question is, then, wholly
one of remedy. Hartman, if his allegations are true, ought to have compensation. He has accepted and paid for the
grain. So far as appears, he has disposed
of it. Shall he be compelled to make
compensation by an action alleging a
fictitious contract to return a portion
of the money paid him, or by an action
alleging a breach of the warranty, or
by an action alleging deception in the
making of the warranty? Forsome reason
the imputation of the deception to the
principal seems to be thought objectionable
in the latest decision on the subject, to
which, until we are better advised, we
deem it proper to defer. Cf. Huffcut,
Agency, 163.
Judgment affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Albert Rogers treated his wife, Juliet,
with such cruelty that she was forced to
leave him. Subsequently, he offlred her
$10,000 if she would return. She accepted
and he gave a promissory note for $10,000
to Edward Young, Young agreeingto hold
the note in trust for Juliet Rogers until
the death of Albert, at which time it would
be payable out of his estate, if Juliet continued to live with him until his death.
Albert Rogers died in 1900, Juliet having
remained with him, and Young sues on
the note.
SCHNEE

and

DONAHOE

for plaintiff.

Return of a cruelly treated wife is sufficient consideration for a contract to pay
money toherafter husband's death. Burkholder's Appeal, 105 Pa. 31; Adams v.
Adams, 91 N.Y. 381; Fisher v. Talbot, 6 Pa.
61; Reamey v. Bayley, 9 Central Reporter
640.
WILLIAMSON and Fox for defendant.
Recovery on the note would be against
public policy. The law will presume that
consideration by the wife and not monetary inducement caused her return. Merrill v. Peaslee, 146 Mass. 460; 15 A. & E.
Encyclopedia, 812.
OPINION OF THE COUT.
In the case at bar the defendant's testator had been guilty of such extreme cruelty
that his wife was forced to leave him, and
by the Act of May 15, 1815, P. & L. Dig.
1633, was entitled to a divorce a vinculo
matrmonii. The consideration for the
notein suit was that she should return and
live with him; this she did, and in the absence of facts to the contrary, it must be
presumed that she lived with him as a
faithful and dutiful wife untii "he died.
This consideration, however construed,
was fully furnished. We must take it that
the wife had a right to refuse to return to
cohabitatioii,and it seems to follow that the
return itself was sufficient consideration
for the note: Burkholder's Appeal, 105 Pa.
31. This case is not like those where the
wife was only doing what she was legally
bound to do. On the other hand the Court
of Errors and Appeals of N. Y. has unanimously sustained the validity of a note
given by a husband to a trustee for the
benefit of his wife upon substantially the
YOUNG vs. ROGERS.
same consideration as the note in suit, and
has declared itself unable to findanything
Action on promissory note. Resumption against public policy in the transaction:
of maritalrelationsas the consideration. Adams v. Adams, 91 N. Y. 81. The Su-
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prenle Court of Pennsylvania supports this
doctrine in the case of Fisher v. Talbot, 6
Pa. 61, saying, "That the settlement of a
sum of money to the separate use of the
wife, her enjoyment of the same to be contingent upon the good behavior of the husband, is not void as against the policy of
the law."
Mrs. Rogers was driven from the home
by her husband's barbarity, the note only
furnishing an additional motive for fidelity, and the contract was not against but
rather in the line of public policy, which
encourages matrimonial harmony; and is
not open to the objection of fraud or infidelity, the payment being contingent that
she should live with him until death:
Reamey v. Bayley, 9 Central Reporter640.
It seems that reason as well as authority will support a contract of this nature.
The actual return to cohabitation was perfectly lawful, whatever the motive which
induced it. I cannot think that it is unlawful to make a lawful act, which the
wife may or may not do as she chooses,
the consideration of a promise, merely because by reaction the making of the promise tends to mingle a worldly motive with
whatever other motives the wife may have
had for renewing her marital relations.
No one doubts that marriage is a sufficient consideration for a promise to pay
money; why should it be more illegal to
make such a promise for the resumption
than for the assumption of conjugal relations? While the law favors the settlement between other parties, it would be a
curiouspolicy which would forbid husband
and wife to compromise their differences,
or preclude either from forgiving a wrong
committed by the other.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
C. A. PiPER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The question presented in this case, has,
we think, been properly solved by the
learned court below. The reasoning in the
majority opinion of Merrill v. Peaslee, 146
Mass. 460, is peculiar, and its morality a
little too stilted for any climate other than
that of the commonwealth whose court
pronounced it. We prefer the dissenting
opinion of Holmes, J., as sounder practically, and not less sound, to say the least,
ethically. It accoxds, too, with the principles of Burkholders' Appeal, 105 Pa. 31,

and with both English and New York
precedents.
Mrs. Rogers had a right to remain separate from her husband on account of his
cruelty. In agreeing to live with him,
and in living with him, she agreed to do
and she did, what she was not bound to
do. She and her peccant husband had a
right tosay that this act was worth$10,000,
and they said so. She has kept her promise. He has died. After he has had the
advantage of the performance of her contract, his administrator must not be permitted to repudiate the obligation imposed
by it on him.
It is supposed to be contrary to public
policy? To what policy? let us ask. Isit
the interest of the state that an offended
wife shall not condone the wrong, and resume cohabitation? Or, is it the interest
of the state that she shall not condone the
wrong, unless she is willing to do so, without a money consideration? As the court
below well says, money may be a consideration, in part, for a marriage, and antenuptial settlements are not forbidden. We
cannot see why, if the parties after marriage have flown apart, the same centripetal influence may not bring them back
into their orbits. We must above all
things avoid being pecksniffian. We see
nothing inconsistent with our conclusion
in Reslers' Appeal, 143 Pa. 386.
Judgment affirmed.
JACOBSON'S ESTATE.
Active trust-Sole and separateusefor life
-Meaning of the word "heirs."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Warren Jacobson died August 12, 1877,
leaving a will by which he gave his farm
to two persons in trust for the sole and separate use of his only child, Sarah, for life,
after her death in trust "for such children
as may survive her,theirheirs and assigns,'
but if she shall leave no children or grandchildren to survive her, then in trust to
convey to his legal heirs. When he died
there were two brothers living, John and
Joseph, also a father, Jonathan, and the
daughter, Sarah. His wife had already
died; Sarah died July 4, 1899. The trustees
then filed an account, subtracting rents accruingbefore and since July 4,1899. These
rents since July 4, 1899, are claimed by the
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two brothers, and also by the devisee of
Sarah, Hannah Jasper, who is a neice of
Sarah's mother. Miss Jasper claims Sarah
took the remainder as right heir of Warren
Jacobson.
Fox and MACGUFFIE for plaintiff cited:

Donohuev. McNichol, 61 Pa. 73; Busby's
Appeal, 61 Pa. 1ll; Abbott v. Bradstreet,
3 Allen 591; McKee v. McKinley, 33 Pa.
92.
MILLER and HICKERNELL for defend-

ant cited:
Stewart's Estate, 147 Pa. 383; Ware v.
Rowland, 2 Phila. 635; McCrea's Estate,
180 Pa. 81; Key's Estate, 4 Dist. 281.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Warren Jacobson died August 12, 1877,
leaving a will by which he gave his farm
to two persons in trust for the sole and
separate use of his only child, Sarah, for
life, after her death in trust "forsuch children as may survive her, their heirs and
assigns; but if she shall leave no children
or grandchildren to survive her, then, in
trust to convey to my right heirs."
When he died there were living two
brothers, John and Joseph, a father, John,
and his daughter, Sarah. His wife had
already died, Sarah died July 4,1899. The
trustees have filed an account embracing
rents accruing before and since July 4,1899.
The rents since July 4, 1899, are claimed
by the two brothers, and also by the devisee of Sarah.
Hannah Jasrer is a niece of Sarah's
mother. Miss Jasper claims that Sarah
took the remainder as right heir of Warren
Jacobson.
The question before us is, did Sarah
take such an estate as to enable her to vest
a good title in her devisee. The will provides that "if she shall leave no children
or grandchildren to survive her, then, in
trust to convey to my right heirs." Does
this mean that the remainder after the
death of Sarah is to go to the heirs of the
testator at his death, or to his heirs at the
death of Sarah?
Under the first limitation it may be
granted that Flarah took only a life estate,
13 Wright 46, and that the remainder in
fee to her children that may survive her,
was contingent or executory. Whether
the remainderto "my right heirs" is tobe
regarded as vested or contingent should
be considered, as it bearsupon the question
whether the heirs of the testator or the
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heirs of Sarah are entitled to the remainder
In 1 Wright 23, and 7 W. & S. 279, the
limitation to heirs was regarded as a vested
remainder, and it is a general rule that a
remainderis vested rather than contingent
if it is possible. The contingency upon
which the heirs were to take the remainder
was dependent upon an independent event
viz., the birth of a child by Sarah, and the
same to survive her. There are numerous
cases, among which may be mentioned
Etter's Appeal, 23 Pa. 281, which would
lead us to consider the remainder as vested;
but we think this case falls more properly
within the class called a contingent remainder with a double aspect. If the estate in the children of Sarah be contingent
upon their birth, a remainder may be
created to vest if their estate does not take
effect; though not good as a remainder if
it was to succeed, instead of being collateral
to the contingent fee.
In an estate to A for life, remainder to the
issue in fee, and in default of issue to B,
the remainder is good, being one collateral
to the contingent fee; or a contingent remainder with a double aspect. Dunwoodie
v. Reed, 2S. &R. 451; Waddell v. Ratten, 5
Rawle 231; Stump v. Fondling, 2 Idem.
168. And as the limitation maybe good as
a contingent remainder, we cannot regard
it as an executory devise.
Now if the remainder is contingent, in
whom did it vest? in the heirs of the testator at his death, who would in this case
be Sarah, P. & L. D. 2410, or those who
were his heirs at Sarah's death? And how
could she devise it, if her death without
children would be the cause of its vesting
so as to devise it? Where is the fee all this
time? The more we question, the more we
are enthralled in mystery. But the courts
have come to our relief and have made a
provision for this complex situation. It is
a general rule, that a bequest to heirs of a
testator or next of kin are construed as referring to those who are such at the time
of the testator's decease, unless differently
manifested. Elnsley v. Young, 2 M. & K.
82; Abbott v. Bradstreet, 8 Allen 589; Etter's Estate, 11 Harris 381; Riehle s Appeal,
4 P. P. Smith 97. In the latter case there
was a limitation over to the testator's
heirs on the death of the tenant for life
without leaving childyen or issue surviving.
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It seems to be a settled principle that
when a situation arises such as in the case
at bar that a devisee for life, who is alsoan
heir of the testator and would takeas such,
on the failure of the contingency, takes
such a present interest as to enable such a
one to devise his estate. Buzby's Appeal,
61 Pa. 111, is in perfect harmony with this
doctrine for in that case the testator devised real estate to one Heylin, his heirs
and assigns, in trust for the use of his son
William for life, and after his death in
trust for his children then living, and lawful issue of such of them as should then be
deceased, their heirs and assigns forever;
and for want of such children or lawful
issue, then in trust for the use of his right
heirs forever. William died unmarried
and without issue. It was held that the
heirs at the death of the father took, among
whom was William, and he died seized
and his devisees took his share of the estate. So we believe that Sarah, being the
only lineal heir,took the farm in fee at his
death, and her devisee is entitled to the
rents accruing since 1899, that are in the
hands of the trustees.
Judgment for the plain tiff.
E. H. BROCK, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The devise in Jacobson's will is to two
persons, in trust for the sole and separate
use of Sarah for life; after her death, "in
trust for such children as may survive her,
their heirs and assigns," but if she shall
leave no chilaren, or grandchildren to survive, then in trust to convey to his legal
heirs.
Sarah took under this devise, an equitable life estate. The remainder was not
given to her heirs, but to such children as
should survive her. The next clause provides for what shall happen, if she shall
leave no children or grandchildren. The
use of the word grandchildren does not
indicate that an indefinite failure of issue
was in view. Reference is plainly made
to the moment of Sarah's death, and to
non-survival, at that time, of children or
grandchildren. The rule in Shelley's case
does not therefore, enlarge the estate of
Sarah from one for life Into one in fee.
The will, on failure of children or grandchildren, directs the trustees to convey the
land to'the testator's legal heirs. If by
this are meant, the heirs at Jacobson's

death, Sarah, the only child, is the one
heir, and as such, takes the fee. On the
other hand, if those who would be Jacobson's heirs had he died after his daughter,
are intended, his brothers would be such
heirs, and would take the fee.
Unless the contrary clearly appears, the
testator's heirs to whom he gives an estate
even after an intervening life estate, are
regarded as those who are such at his
death. Thefact thatthe life tenant is one
or even the only heir, is not enough to
convince the court that heirs of a later
time were intended. Buzbys' Appeal, 61
Pa. 111, Stewarts' Estate, 147 Pa. 383; McCreas' Estate, 180 Pa. 81. Strictly no one
who is not an heir of a decedent at his
death, can ever become such. His daughter
Sarah was Jacobson's heir. His brothers
and his father were not. They would
have been had Sarah not been alive, but
her e:uistence prevented their ever being
his heir. Had there been no will, the land
would have devolved on Sarah, and those
who thereafter took by inheritance would
take by inheritance from her and not from
her father.
The word heirs, however, is often used
to designate those who would be heirs,
but for a devise, or the existence of some
nearer kin. The only question is, is there
sufficient indication that the testator
meant such persons as would be his heirs,
had he lived until the death of his
daughter. We incline to think that there
is. Let it be observed, firstly, that the
devise is to trustees, who are to hold the
land during the daughter's life, and secondly, that those trustees are, at her death,
no children surviving, to convey the land
to the legal heirs. The testator isimagining a conveyance. This conveyance is to
be made after his daughter's death. It Is
to be made tohis heirs. Hedidnotintend,
he could not have intended it to be made
to her. He was plainly thinking of some
one else. A grant presupposes a grantee
in existence.
The conveyance is to be made to the
"legal heirs." When the will was written,
and the testator died, he had but one
child. His nearest of kin, beyond her,
were his father and his brothers. If he
had contemplated the estate as passing to
his daughter, he would, in strictness, have
said "legal heir."
He was evidently
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thinking ofsomeoneelse than his daughter.
Cf. Pierce v. Hubbard, 152 Pa. 18; Passmore's Administrator's Appeal, 23 Pa. 381.
We are of the opinion therefore that the
daughter Sarah took no devisable estate,
and that, at her death without issue, the
land passed to the brothers, the father
having previously died. The rents collected by the trustees after July 4th, 1899,
are hence payable to them.
Decree set aside, with procedendo.
FLANNIGAN vs. DAUPHIN MFG. CO.
Fellow servant - Vice principal- Risk
assumed by employee-Responsibility of
master.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff was injured while running an
elevator in defendant's mill. One day,
Star, the superintendent of the mill, told
a workman to put a truck, containing a
quantity of material, on the elevhtor and
then said: "Mr. Flannigan, thesegoods are
to go upstairs."
The elevator ran a few inches and then
fell to the basement, some twenty feet, and
plaintiff was injured. The fall was due to
the fact that the elevator was overloaded.
This was shown by testimony of expert
witnesses, to which defendant objected.
The court directed the jury to render a
verdict.for plaintiff, and defendant asked
the court to grant a new trial because:
1. The court erred in admitting expert
testimony.
2. Plaintiff assumed the risk that the
elevator might fall.
3. The superintendent was not a vicemaster.
4. The superintendent did not order him
to take the goods up.
CLARK and MARx for plaintiff.
1. The expert testimony was properly
admitted. Bier v. Standard Mfg. Co., 130
Pa. 446; Schaeffer v. Ry. Co., 168 Pa. 209;
Piollet v. Simmers, 106 Pa. 95; Dooner v.
Canal Co., 164 Pa. 17.
2. [t is the duty of the master to furnish
safe machinery and a safe place to work.
Bonner v. Bridge Co., 183 Pa. 278; Davidson v. Humes, 188 Pa. 339.
3. The superintendent was avice-master
and the master is liable to the employee
for his acts. Ross v. Walker, 13a Pa. 42;
Prescott v. Ball. Eng. Co., 176 Pa. 459;
Prevdss v. Ice Co., 485 Pa. 628.
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HOLCOME and PIPER for defendant.
1. By accepting the employment Flannigan assumed all risks naturally and
reasonably incident thereto. Payne v.
Rees.e, 100 Pa. 306; Clough v. Hoffinan,
132 Pa. 626; Woodward v. Shumpp, 120
Pa. 458.
2. Though the injured employee was
under the controlof him whose negligence
caused the injury, he cannot recover on the
ground that he was injured through the
negligence of a vice-principal. Lehigh
Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432; Frazier
v. Penn. R. R. Co., 38 Pa. 104; Caldwell v.
Brown, 53 Pa. 453.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This was an action in trespass for personal injuries caused by the fall of a freight
elevator operated by Flannigan, the plaintiff, in defendant's mill. The verdict having gone for the plaintiff, the Dauphin
Mfg. Co. has obtained a Iule to show cause
why there should not be a new trial, and
four grounds for it have been assigned
which will be considered seriatim. Defendant's first contention is, "The court erred
in admitting expert testimony." -The
elevator, it was proved, rose a few inches
and then fell to the bottom of the shaft.
Expert testimony was educed to show that
the fall was due to overloading. The cause
of the fall, in making plaintiff's case, was
material, and we believe that expert evidence was properly admitted to prove the
cause of said fall. "Expert evidence is
evidence given upon matters that are not
within the range of men ofordinary knowledge and observation,by persons of peculiar
skill and knowledge thereon." The expert's efficiency is not questioned and he
is presumed to have been a man thoroughly
familiar with the mechanism of elevators,
but defendants contend that in this instance it was improper to admit expert
testimony. It is riot presumed that the
average juror is so familiar with the
machinery of an elevator as to be able to
arrive at a vital conclusion from the mere
testimony of the plaintiff and others, and
without a knowledge of the premises, or
the assistance of one who is familiar with
every wheel and rope, and can state the
prnbable tension which ropes of various
weights and diameters will endure; the
juror's daily duties probably do not require
a knowledge of machinery, and he very
likely knows as little of its workings, as,
for example, the expert in medicine is
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likely to know of the intricacies of a fine
Flannigan to take the goods up." Star
machine; but when in either case we wish
was vice-master with full charge of the
to prove a material allegation wherein a
mill; Flannigan was a servant employed
philosophy is involved with which the
to run the elevator. Star's words were:
averageman is unfamiliar, to whom should
"Mr. Flannigan, these goods are to go up
we look? Surely to one who is an expert
stairs." Considerating the relation of the
in the particular calling or profession. The
parties, and the words used, we are of
cases are many, but see Bier v. Standard
opinion that the words amounted to an
Mfg. Co., 130 Pa. 446; also Sullivan v.
order. Star simply, and very properly,
Thorndike Co., 175 Mass. 41, in which, at
used polite language, but with the goods
trial of action for personal injuries caused
on the elevator, and Flannigan, the operatby an elevator fall, thecauseof the fall was
or at nand and addressed, there is no misheld a proper subject for expert testimony.
taking the result that they were expected
Defendant's second contention
is:
to bring about; he did not say, "Flannigan,
"Plaintiff assumed the risk that the eletake those goods upstairs," but Flannigan
vator might fall." If this be true, we
considered the words used as orders; there
practically would have a rule that the act
was no discretion either, for the goods were
of going on the elevator was a waiver of
there ready to go up and so was Flanvigan,
plaintiff's right to recover in any event;
the operator. For reasons Immaterial to
or, in other words, that he placed his fate in
us, Star wanted the goods up stairs, so he
defendant's hands; the elevator was not
did not leave it to Flannigan and say,
obviously dangerous, and there were no
"You may or may not take theni upstairs,"
patent defects which wouldchargeplaintiff but he did say, after the goods were in
with contributory negligence; he undoubtplace, "Mr. Flannigan, these goods are to
edly had used the hoister many times be- go upstairs." The words plainly amounted
fore, and this time lie used it at the order
to an order. The rule for a new trial is
of Star, when the same was not obviously
discharged.
MITCHEzLL, 3].
overloaded, and with the belief that the
trip could be safely made. The fact that
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
subsequently it was proved that the eleWe are convinced, after a careful convator was overloaded, we believe does not
sideration of this case, that the decision
exonerate the company from liability.
reached by the learned court below, is ac"Where the servant, in obedience to the
curate.
master,incurs the riskofmachinery,which,
Whether the elevator was overloaded or
though dangerous, is not so much so as to
not was not a problem so simple that the
threaten immediate injury, or, itis reasonordinary juror could solve it. It would be
ably probable may be used safely, by ex- necessary to know the construction of an
traordinary caution, the master is liable elevator, and the weights which ropes or
for a resulting accident." Patterson v.
cables of a certain thickness, make and
P. & C. R. R. Co., 76 Pa. 389. The second
material would support, as well as the
ground is overruled. Defendant's third actual weight of the load that caused the
contention is: "The superintendent was platform to fall. The uninstructed juror
not a vice-master."
would not know anything of the material
It is not denied that Star was the super- or arrangements of an elevator, nor the
intendent of the mill, of the entire mill,
tensile strength of the rope or cables, singly
which means that he was acting for the
or in the special combination in which
Dauphin Mfg. Co. in all departments; he
they were. The former might have been
had supervision of all the work, it would
described to him but not so as to imseem from the evidence in the court below,
part an adequate conception of the maand he plainly was representing the cor- chinery. The latter could be given to him
poration as their sole man in charge; we
only by an expert. We see no error in albelieve that Star was a vice-master, not a
lowing the witness, whose qualifications
fellow-workman, and overrule defendant's
as an expert are not questioned, to express
third contention.
the opinion that the elevator was overDefendant's fourth and last contention
loaded.
is: "The superintendent did not order
Flannigan is not shown to have been an
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expert, nor to have known that the load
on the elevator was excessive. He had
reason to think that Star did know
whether it was excessive or not, and that
he would not require him to go on the
elevator, if there was danger of a fall. We
see no reason for supposing that he "assumed the risk that the elevator might
fall."
It is objected that the error of judgment
of Star is an error of a co-employe, and
not imputable, for the benefit of Flannigan, to the defendant. The corporation
existed for the purpose of operating, and
was operating, a mill. Staris styled in the
evidence, the "superintendent of the mill."
No one else seems to have been present at
the mill or exercised control there. The
discretion of the corporation was directly
exercised by him. We think the conclusion of the learned court, that he was a
vice-principal, a sound one.
It is hardly necessary to dwell on the
objection that the superintendent did not
order Flannigan to take the goods up.
The words, "Mr. Flannigan, these goods
are to go up stairs," are not predictive.
Flannigan must have understood from
them, that it was his duty to see that they
were taken up. They hadjust been placed
on the elevator, and it was clear that they
were to be taken up by means of it.
Judgment affirmed.
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the above mentioned legacies, he gave to
the widow. The fund in the executor's
hands is $3743. The auditor has deducted
all the sums paid to the children before
and since the making of the will from
their legacies, and awarded the residue of
the estate to the widow. Exceptions.
THORNE and TURNER for legatees.
Cited Act of Feb. 24. 1834, P. & L.'s
Digest. Vol 1 P. 1508; 6 Watts 85; 4 Wharton 399, 10 Watts 54, 6 Wharton 370.
NICHOLS and MooN for widow.
Cited 144 Pa. 191,152 Pa. 609,165 Pa. 605,
148 Pa. 145, 150 Pa. 580, 158 Pa. 292.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
William Wilson died Sept. 3, 1894, and
by his will directed certain legacies to be
paid to his children. To Henry he bequeathed $9,000, to Charles$8,400. to Sarah
$7,000; but prior to making his will he had
given Charlesat different times theamount
of $600 which he had made a record of in
a book, headed advancements, and to
Sarah he had given $2,000 and had said it
was a part of her share in the estate.
These two items constitute the grounds
for exceptions taken to the report of the
Auditor who deducted these sums from the
legacies bequeathed to Charles and Sarah.
We think the learned auditor erred in
deducting these items from that given by
the will to Charles and Sarah. In case
the decedent had died intestate we think
it would have been proper, and such eviWILLIAM WILSON'S ESTATE.
dence would then have been admissible,
but where a parent makes advancements
Will-Advancements-Abatement of
to one or more of his children, and afterlegacies.
wards makes his will disposing of all of his
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
property among his children without makWilson died on Sept. 13, 1894, and his ing any' notice to the advancements before
will, written Aug. 11, 1893, bequeathed given, it is conceived that each child will
$9,000 to his son Henry, $8,400 to his son
take what is bequeathed to it without beCharles, and $7,000 to his daughter Sarah.
ing liable to any abatement or deduction
Before writing the will, he had given at
whatever. Krieder v. Boyer, 10 Watts 54;
various times $1,350 to Charles, and had in
Reinhold's Estate, 8 Lan. Review 217.
a book headed advancements, put four of When a person makes a will, their intenthese items amounting to $600. He had a tions govern the d stribution; if any dec.note for $750 from Charles. He had given laration of the decedent could be admitted,
$2,000 to Sarah at the time of her marriage it would be contrary to the act regulating
and orally said that the sum was part of the making of will and it would be useless
her share in his estate. No written mem- to make wills. In this case it seems to be
orandum of it, however, was found. After the intention of the testator to give his
the will was written, he lent, Sept. 11,
children equal shares. He had given
1893, $300 to Henry; Oct. 15, 1893, $500 to 'Charles $600,and he now gives him $8,400,
Charles; Dec. 13, 1893, $250 to Sarah; tak- and to Sarah, to whom he had given $2,000
ing their notes, payable" with interest at he now gives $7,000. In this, the intention
his death. The residue of his estate, after of the testator was to make all share alike,
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These advancements were simply gifts
to the children, and bhe testator in his last
will deducted the same from the share he
intended each to have; and it was error for
the learned auditor to deduct the same
again.
We therefore sustain the exceptions to
the report of the auditor, and direct that
the legatees be charged with the amount
of the notes held against them, and that
sum deducted from their respective legaIn this case each is entitled to
cies.
his pro-rata share of the amount of the
estate, and there being no residue and the
widow not claiming against the will, she
will be unable to receive anything out of
the estate; for it will not pay the legacies.
Exceptions sustained.
WILLIAM H. TRUDE, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
We think the conclusion reached by the
learned judge of the Orphans' Court correct. It was evidently the intention of
the testator to give his children equal
shares in his estate, viz: $9,000. From
Charles, he held at tile time of writing the
will a note for $750, which Charles must,
He had advanced to
of course, pay.
Charles $600. This he deducts from $9,000
and he bequeaths to Charles the remainder,
$8,400. To Henry he had made neither loan
nor advancement, and therefore he bequeaths to him $9,000. At the time of her
marriage, he had given to Sarah $2,000,
which, as he had orally declared, was to be
regarded a part of her share of his estate.
He accordingly bequeaths to her $7,000.
Not only does the will not show that
sums previously paid to Charles and Sarah
are to be taken from the legacies given
them, but it shows with certainty the
contrary to have been the testator's intention. The gift by will of a fractional share
of an estate would not be subject to a reduction on account of advancements made
prior to the will, unless the will indicated
that such reduction was intended. Kreider v. Boyer, 10 W. 54; Watson v. Watson,
6 W. 258; Wright's Appeal, 89 Pa. 67;
Davis' Estate, 9 Dist. Rep. 431. Wilson
gives, not a fifth, fourth, or third of his
estate, nor does he give the estate to the
three equally, but he specifies the exact
number of dollars which each is to receive.
The balance for distribution is only
$3,743. The legacies to the children must

abate equally. Charles will be treated as
having already received$1,250 and interest;
Henry $300 and interest, and Sarah $250
and interest. They will receive such parts
of the fund, in addition, as will make the
payments to them equal.
Exception is taken to the form of the
exceptions to the auditor's report. These
exceptions might have been more specific.
The Orphans' Court might have compelled
the exceptant to make them more distinct. Its omission to do so, the casehaving been heard on its merits, cannot be assigned for error in this court.
Appeal dismissed.
ALICE GOODHUE vs. THOMAS
LYNCH.
Afarket value-Striking out partof
answer of witness.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Action in trespass for conversion of a
sofa. Evidence having been introduced
as to its construction and age, a witness,
who had been qualified as an experton the
value of furniture, was asked, "What
would be the fair market value of that
sofa? Answer-"To anybody that liked
antique furniture, $50: but if sold at auction or to a person who didn't care for antique furniture, $15.
Defendant objected to the answer and
asked that the first clause be stricken out,
overruled. Exception. Appeal.
STERRETT and J. RHODES for appellant.

The market value is a price established
by public sales or sales in the way of ordinary business. Bouvier's Law Dictionary
317; 72 Pa. 376, 74 Pa. 369.
Evidence of particular value is not allowable to establish market value, 107 Pa.
464.
TRUDE and DAviS for appellee.

If part of an answer be stricken out the
whole should be stricken out.
A refusal to strike out evidence is not
the subject of an exception, U. S. Telg. Coi
v. Wenger, 55 Pa. 263.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The exception taken by the appellants
is the admission of the expert to the question as to what the value (if the sofa would
be. On being asked time market value he
replied, "To anyone who liked antique
furniture $50," and it is on this admission
that an appeal is taken. That there is
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sufficient evidence of conversion to submit
to the jury is proven beyond a doubt b&
the statement of facts; therefore the verdict
and judgment must stand unless there was
error in the rulings of the court. The
cases cited by the appellants do not, we
think, have any bearing on this case; and
so far as we have been able to learn from a
careful examination, there has been no decision on this very point in this state.
The value of the chattel to the plaintiff
was what she could receive for it. In conversion the damage recoverable is the value
of the chattel. The value may be aseertained in several ways. In some cases it
is ascertained by market value at the time
of conversion. It appears that this chattel
could be sold for two prices, accordingly,
as buyers were common purchasers, or
dealers in antique furniture. She could
easily have disposed of the sofa to a dealer
of antique furniture for $50, and we have
no evidence but what the party guilty of
the conversion might, or, possibly, did dispose of it at this price. To confine the
damages to $15 would be to permit the
wrong doer to profit by his own wrong,
and this the law will not permit. Hence
the evidence of its value to dealers of antique furniture was admissible. Such is
the English rule. In Armory v. Delamirie,
1 Strange 505, the plaintiff found a diamond ring and took it to a jeweler to find
out what it was. The jeweler took out the
stones and gave the plaintiff the ring without them. He brought an action against
the defendant. Several jewelers gave testimony as to what a jewel of the finest
water that would fit the ring would be
worth, and the court directed the jury,
that unless the defendant produced it,
they should presume the stones to be of
the finest water and make the value of the
best jewels the measure of damages, which
they did.
Therefore, we do not regard the admission of the testimony in the case at bar as
erroneous.
Judgment affirmed.
H. P. KATZ, J.
OPINION OF SUPREMIE COURT.
The object of the question to the witness
was to obtain information for the jury of
the value of the sofa for whose conversion
the action had been brought against the
defendant. The witness was required to

say "what would be the fair market value
of the sofa." He mentioned two values, one
for virtuosi- and another for the ordinary
buyer. "To anybody that liked antique
furniture, fifty dollars" would be, he said,
a fair market value; "if sold at auction or
to a person that didn't care for antique
furniture, fifteen dollars."
Neither of these statements was a square
answer to the question. The antiqueness
of the sofa was a property of it which had
value. The possession of that property
would affect the market value of the sofa,
just as the materials of which it was coinposed, the state of its preservation, etc.
What those wh6 did not regard its peculiarities as of value would give for it, would
not be afair measure of its value. As well
say that the price for a strong, fleet horse
which those attaching no value to fleetness
or those attaching no value to strength,
would give for it, was a fair measure of its
value. The market value is the price
which the sofa would probably bring, in
view of all its properties, and of the competition which they altogether would exeite among possible buyers.
The defendant asked the court to strike
out so much of the answer as placed on the
sofa a value larger, possibly, than the market value, while allowing that part which
placed, probably, too low a value on it to
stand. We think the whole answer ought
to have been rejected or retained. The
defendant could not retain the part which
he liked and discard the part which told
against him.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN ROLAND vs. JOHN PHILIPS,
Ex. of AMOS JESSUP.
Promissoryl note-Seal-Statute of limitations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Amos Jessup, uncle of John Jessup, on
March 2d, 1866, wrote a promissory note
for $10,000 payable to John Jessup 30 years
after date, and reciting that John Jesbup
stood to makei; as son to father. There
was a testimonial clause "witness my
hand and seal the 2d day of March, 1866."
The note was signed Amos Jessup, but
only a blot followed the name. Amos
Jessup died in 1888 and the action was
brought in 1900 against Philips, as execu-
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tor, by Roland who bought the note for
$5,000 the day after Amos died.
CORE and CLAYCOMB for plaintiff.
GROSS and MAYS for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The origin of action upon this note was
by John Roland, the assignee of John
Jessup. The plaintiffs asking to amend
their action, it was granted under act of
March 21, 1806, which provides that no
plaintiffshall be non-suited for unformality
in any statement or declaration or by
reason ofanyinformality in entering aplea.
The plaintiff shall be permitted to amend
his declaration or statement.
The note was a non-negotiable instrument, as it was made payable to John
Jessup. In 29 Pa. 529, it is held that to
give a note the character of negotiability,
it must be made payable to a person or his
order, or assigns, or to the bearer or some
equivalent phrase. It being a non-negotiable note, the indorsee can't, independent
of statute, sue the maker or drawer of such
note, so held in 1 Dallas 194.
If this note was or was not under seal,
it isa question of fact for thejury to decide.
The maker recites in said note, "Witness
my hand and seal" and after his signature
appears a blot. We would not undertake
to say this was a seal, for the maker may
not have so intended and may have
written the words "Witness my hand
and seal" as mere form and having no
significance.
The note is dated March 2, 1866, payable
thirty years after date, making it due
March, 1896. In 1888, eight years before
maturity, the maker, Amos Jessup, died
and no action was brought until 1900, four
years after maturity and twelve years after
death of maker. The act of Feb. 24, 1834,
provides that all debts owing by any person
within this state, at the time ofhis decease,
shall be paid by his executors or administrators so far as they shall have assets, in
the manner and order following, viz.: Funeral expenses, medicine furnished and
medical attendance given during the last
Illness of the decedent, andservant's wages
not exceeding one year. Rents not exceeding one year. All other debts, without regard to the quality of the same, except
debts due to the commonwealth, which
shall be paid last. By this statute, the
plaintiff is given a right of action.

The defendants claim that the statute of
limitations will not allow him to recover.
The statute of June 8, 1893, providing that
all lien of debts not of record shall remain
a lien on the real estate of such decedent
longer than two years after the decease of
such debtor, unless an action for the recovery thereof be commenced against his
heirs, executors or kdministrators within
the period of two years after his decease,
and duly prosecuted to judgment or acopy
or particular written statement of any
bond, covenant, debt or demand, when the
same is not payable within the said period
of two years, shall be filed within the
period of two years in the office of the prothonotary, and then to be a lien only for
the period of two years after said bond,
covenant, debt or demand becomes due.
This statute will not apply as the decedent
died in 1888, six years prior to enactment
of statute.
The statute of limitations upon unsealed
notes, if such this be, will not apply, for
the action is brought four years after the
note matured and the statute will not begin to run uhtil maturity and must run
more tban six years in order to have the
action. We therefore render judgment for
the plaintiff.
R. J. BoRYER,
J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

The note of Amos Jeesup was either
sealed or unsealed. If sealed it became
payable March 2d, 1896. The seal was a
substitute for a consideration. The action
upon it was brought in 1900. Amos Jessup
had died in 1888. It is evident that nothing hinders a recovery. The action is in
the name of John Jessup, to the use of
John Roland; who paid $5,000 for the note.
It is clear that $10,000, with interest, may
be recovered upon it, and for the use of
Roland. If Jessup chose to sell a right to
receive from the estate of Amos Jessup,
$10,000 for $5,000, the estate has no veto,
nor can it escape paying the whole sum
named in his note.
The note had a testimonium clause,
"witness my hand and seal the 2d day of
March, 1866." Had there been no mark
after the signature that could have been
intended to be a seal, the note would have
to be treated as without a seal, although
Amos Jessup may have intended to affix
one to it. Taylor v. Geaser, 2 S. & R. 502.

THE FORUM
There is such a mark. Was it intended to
be a seal? If it was, it is a seal. If it was
not, it is not a seal. We cannot say that
it Nvas error for the court to allow the jury
to infer that the mark is a seal. The
testimonium clause with the character of
the mark is sufficient to support this inference. Any kind of a mark, if intended for,
will serve as, a seal. Lorah v. Nissley, 156
Pa. 329; Hacker's Appeal, 121 Pa. 192.
Let us, however, suppose that the note
is unsealed. It will then be as effectual to
support this action as if sealed. It is payable to John Jessup, -not to John Jessup or
order, or bearer. It is not negotiable. The
action must therefore be brought in the
name of John Jessup to the use of Roland,
as it is in fact brought.
The statute of limitations does not bar
the action, for it was brought when the
note was but four years old. The death of
the maker has no influence on the decision.
Amos Jessup died in 1888. The lapse of
twelve years or any larger number, since
the debtor's death, has no effect on the
right to sue when the statute of limitations
has not completed its bar. Cf. Fitler's
Estate, 6 Super. 364; Jones' Appeal, 99
Pa. 124. It does not appear that the
estate of Amos Jessup has been settled
up, and his administrator discharged, and
if it has not been settled up, nor the administrator discharged, there is no reason for
refusing to give a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff.
It is a mistake to suppose that the period
of lien on the real estate of a decedent is
controlling. Were the effort now making,
one to fasten the debt as a lien on the
decedent's land, within five years after the
maker's death, it would fail, since, so far as
appears, the note was not. filed in the prothonotary's office, as, when the debt would
not become payable within that time, was,
in 1888, necessary. But the impossibility of
acquiring a lien on the land is no obstacle
to prosecuting the claim against the personalty, if any remains.
Judgment affirmed.
PAULEL v. ROCHESTER AND
PITTSBURG COAL & IRON CO.
Tre8pass-stoppel-Actof May 2, 1876.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On March 20, 1894, the plaintiff in this
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action brought suit against the same defendant to recover damages for the breaking down, subsiding and falling in of his
surface land, due to the removal of the
coal from under the same and restricted
his claim to a part of the said tract of the
surface land owned by him, to wit: 29 acres
thereof and its appurtenances.
That on January 25, 1898, the plaintiff
in the action served notice on the defendant that he proposed to claim damages up
to the dhte of the trial of the same. That
evidence under and pursuant of this iotice
was introduced by the plaintiff on the
trial of said action accordingly, which action terminated in the verdict of a jury,
in his favor May 19, 1898, on which a final
judgment was thereafter had.
That the present action has been brought
to recover damages for the breaking down,
subsiding and falling in of the surface in
another part of the same surface land of
which the 29 acres are a part, accruing
since the former action was instituted, or
since March 20, 1894.
That no coal has been removed from
under the plaintiff's surface land since
March 20, 1894, and there is no testimony
leading to show that there has been any
breaks, subsidances or other disturbances
of the surface land in suit, viz: the 31 acres,
since May 19, 1898. Upon this state of
facts is reserved the question of law,
namely, "Is the plaintiff estopped and debarred by the action brought March 20,
1894, and the subsequent notice of their
intention to claim damages therein up to
the time of trial of same, from claiming
damages to any part of his said surface
land to what had accrued, and for which a
right of action existed prior to May 19,1898?
The notice was given in pursuance of the
act of May 2, 1876.
MARX for plaintiff.
The subsiding of the second portion of
the tract occurred after the institution or
the first suit, therefore there was no right
of action as to it at that time. 1 Addis n
on Torts, 101; Pollock on Torts, 159-165;
Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485.
GRAUL and FRANK for defendants.
In Pennsylvania, damages, past, present
and future are to be estimated in one action. Water Co. v. Iron Co., 84 Pa. 279;
R. R. Co. v. Jones, 111 Pa. 204.
Judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to every matter
which they might have litigated as Inci-
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dent to the original action.
R. Co., 102 N. Y. 452.

FORUM

Griffin v. R.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

It was a rule of the common law that in
trespass and tort new actions may be
brought as often as new injuriesand wrongs
are repeated, Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr
1077. Thus it has been held that an action
may be maintained and damages recovered
for placing stumps and stakes in the
plaintiff's land and a second action maintained and damages recovered for leaving
them there, Bowyer v. Cook, 4 C. B. 236.
It cannot be doubted that the action of
the case at bar is brought for a different
injury than the action of March 20, 1894.
It is true that no coal has been removed
since, but the plaintiff is not bringing his
action for the removal of coal;nor could he
do so, for the removal is not the injury
which affects him. The injury to him is
the breaking down, subsiding and falling
in of his surface land, and there are two
distinct breakiugs down, subsidings and
failings in. At common law, the second
action is therefore maintainable.
But the defendant contends that under
the act of May 2, 1876, the plaintiff might

have recovered for the second injury as
well as the first, and, therefore, cannot
maintain the second action. The rule of
law thus stated is correct, Griffin v. Long
Island R. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 452. But the
act of 1876 does not cover the case at bar.
That act is applicable to those trespassers
in which a second action might be brought
for damages sustained after service of
writ but the right to which would be determined by the verdict in the first suit
and not for wrongs which from their very
nature are perpetrated at only distinct and
rare intervals, neither being the consequences of the other, and are, as we have
seen, so separated from each other that the
right to damages for the second injury was
not determined by the first suit. In Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, it was held that
a prior verdict and judgment in another
action for injuries to the same property
may not be set up asa bar when pleadings
declare the fact that the two causes" of action are for iiijuries to different portions of
We are, therefore, of the
the property.
opinion that both on authority and on
principle this action is maintainable.
KENNEDY, J.

